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CONSTRUCTION OF A TERRORIST UNDER 
THE MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTE, 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
JORDAN E. HELTON* 
 The material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, provides the government 
with a powerful tool to prosecute any individual it believes is providing material 
support to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO)—even if the individual does 
not intend to facilitate any terrorist acts.  This law poses a problem for 
humanitarian aid groups that seek to provide much-needed assistance to those 
who often live amongst alleged “terrorists” or under a de facto FTO-led regime.  
Further exacerbating this problem, no appellate-level courts have ever defined 
how to determine whether an individual is part of an FTO under § 2339B.  
Without this definition, humanitarian organizations are often discouraged 
from providing aid widely for fear of inadvertently providing aid to an FTO, 
thereby risking prosecution under the statute. 
 With little to no guidance from the courts, a district court in United States 
v. Jama attempted to provide the answer to the FTO question, but the test it 
created is flawed.  Instead of looking to analogous legal doctrines, it set forth a 
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vague, non-exclusive seven-factor test that misinterpreted aspects of § 2339B’s 
language and granted too much discretion to the judiciary. 
Instead of following the test from Jama, the proper test should incorporate 
principles from international humanitarian law and the U.S. government’s 
terrorist sanctioning regimes.  First, the individual should either be “owned or 
controlled by, or . . . act for or on behalf of,” an FTO; or “assist in, sponsor, or 
provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other 
services to or in support of” the FTO.  Second, the individual must be directly 
participating in the furtherance of the FTO’s goals at the time the individual 
receives the material support.  A test based on these two factors clarifies who 
should be part of an FTO under § 2339B and balances the importance of 
personal conduct and actions on behalf of an FTO with an understanding of 
the variety of organizational structures found within FTOs. 
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In the spring of 2017, the threat of famine loomed large over 
Somalia, an east African country facing its worst drought in close to 
forty years.1  At least half the country, 6.2 million people, faced the 
prospect of acute food shortage.2  The situation was dire:  in March, 
the Somali government estimated that at least 110 individuals had died 
of hunger in just a two-day period in a single region, and the United 
Nations was calling for urgent aid.3  Yet in addition to staring down the 
threat of starvation, many of those in the most serious danger—about 
2 million people—also lived under the shadow of al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda 
affiliate that the United States had designated as a foreign terrorist 
organization (FTO).4  Instead of rushing to distribute aid to all of those 
in need within the country, U.S. humanitarian aid groups hesitated to 
reach those 2 million people living in close proximity to al-Shabaab.5  
                                               
 1. See Jason Burke, Anti-Terrorism Laws Have “Chilling Effect” on Vital Aid Deliveries 
to Somalia, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/apr/26/anti-terrorism-laws-have-chilling-effect-on-vital-aid-
deliveries-to-somalia. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Colin Dwyer, Drought Threatens to Drive Famine in Somalia as Hunger Kills More 
than 100, NPR (Mar. 5, 2017, 10:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/03/05/518624610/drought-threatens-to-drive-famine-in-somalia-as-
hunger-kills-more-than-100. 
 4. See Burke, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. (naming the necessary payment of “taxes” at road blocks run by armed 
groups and “negotiations with local community and clan elders, of whom some are 
likely to be connected to the insurgents” as possible complications to reaching 
individuals without also coming into contact with al-Shabaab). 
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If they did so, the aid groups claimed they feared being exposed to 
potential prosecution under U.S. counterterrorism laws, the most 
potent of which are referred to as the “material support” statutes.6 
The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B,7 have 
been at the core of the U.S. Justice Department’s terrorism 
prosecution efforts since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.8  
These statutes are two of several federal anti-terrorism statutes 
covering a broad array of crimes, from “arson”9 to “use of weapons of 
mass destruction,”10 that Congress designed to fight terrorist activity at 
its source and to give law enforcement multiple opportunities to arrest 
those seeking to facilitate terrorist acts.11  Sections 2339A and 2339B in 
particular are among the most frequently prosecuted federal anti-
terrorism statutes12—from the 9/11 attack to December 2015, the 
government charged 318 individuals and successfully convicted 263 
                                               
 6. Id. 
 7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012). 
 8. A Review of the Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on Material Support to Terrorism] (statement 
of Barry Sabin, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice); see also David 
Cole, Out of the Shadows:  Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. 
REV. 693, 723 (2009) (“Although rarely enforced before 9/11, [§ 2339B] has since 
become a principal tool in the Justice Department’s ‘terrorism’ prosecutions.”). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 81. 
 10. § 2332a. 
 11. See Hearing on Material Support to Terrorism, supra note 8, at 2 (statement of Barry 
Sabin, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (explaining that 
Congress wrote the material support statutes with the recognition that “there are 
important components of the terrorist infrastructure that stop short of actual attacks”); 
Nicole Hong, “Material Support” Statute Is Front and Center in Antiterror Push, WALL ST. J. 
(May 27, 2015, 7:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/material-support-statute-is-
front-and-center-in-antiterror-push-1432719002 (describing § 2339B as a statute 
Congress wrote with “broad wording . . . to help law enforcement catch people who 
facilitate terrorist activity in any way”).  For further discussion of §§ 2339A and 2339B’s 
statutory language, see discussion infra Section I.B. 
 12. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 3, 14 (2006), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf 
(“The material support statutes have been a cornerstone of our success in terrorism 
financing cases as well as in a wide range of other cases addressing all types of support 
to terrorism.  Our effective use of these statutes has allowed us to intervene at the early 
stages of terrorist planning, before a terrorist act occurs.”); CTR. ON LAW & SEC., 
TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:  SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 13–14 (2001) 
[hereinafter TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD], http://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/TTRC-Ten-Year-Issue.pdf (citing § 2339B as the first and 
§ 2339A as the second most commonly charged terrorism crimes since 2009). 
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under these statutes.13  The statutes serve two separate purposes:  
(1) § 2339A prohibits providing “material support” to facilitate a 
terrorist activity,14 and (2) § 2339B prohibits providing “material 
support” to an FTO.15 
Section 2339B, the farther reaching of the statutes, imposes criminal 
liability on individuals who “knowingly provide[] material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[] or 
conspire[] to do so.”16  Congress created the law in recognition of the 
“fungibility,” or interchangeable nature, of the support an individual 
provides to an FTO.17  In the mid-1990s, there was substantial public 
concern that money or other support an individual gave to an FTO, 
even if given to solely support religious or social services, would free 
up other funds that could then be spent promoting terrorist activities.18  
To assuage this concern, Congress purposefully drafted § 2339B to 
prohibit any and all support to an FTO, no matter how the individual 
intended the FTO to use the support. 
Despite the rich congressional history and abundance of § 2339B 
criminal cases, no appellate-level court has ever specifically addressed 
the elements necessary for a court to deem the individual receiving the 
support to be part of an FTO—a fact that the federal district court in 
United States v. Jama19 found particularly frustrating.  In the 2016 district 
court case, the defendants—individuals accused of providing material 
support to al-Shabaab, an FTO operating in east Africa—asserted that 
the individuals receiving the “material support” were not in fact 
associated with the FTO at all, and therefore, the government could 
not prosecute them under the statute.20  The district court itself, in 
discussing the history of § 2339B jurisprudence, acknowledged that 
there was “surprisingly little case law” to serve as guidance in answering 
                                               
 13.  See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FEDERAL COURTS CONTINUE TO TAKE LEAD IN 
COUNTERTERRORISM PROSECUTIONS (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/ 
default/files/Federal-Courts-Continue-to-Take-Lead-in-CT-Prosecutions.pdf.  From 
2007 to 2010, criminal prosecutions against individuals suspected of providing 
“material support” to terrorist organizations jumped from 11.6 percent to 69.4 
percent.  See, e.g., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 12, at 19. 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 
 15. § 2339B. 
 16. § 2339B(a)(1). 
 17. H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 81 (1995). 
 18. See infra Section I.A (discussing the motivation for closing the economic 
loophole of § 2339A and the associated impetus behind enacting § 2339B). 
 19. 217 F. Supp. 3d. 882 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 20. Id. at 890. 
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the question.21  The dearth of precedent forced the court to create a 
test from scratch—and with poor results.  Deciding that an individual 
is part of an FTO when the individual engages in “significant activity” 
on behalf of the FTO, the court relied on an inappropriately broad 
seven-factor test that considered everything from self-identification 
with an FTO to how the support benefitted an FTO.22 
Notwithstanding the Jama test, the lack of a clear judicial definition 
of who is part of an FTO under § 2339B has been especially troubling 
for humanitarian aid groups.  The distinction between an unaffiliated 
individual and a member of an FTO is particularly blurred for those 
on the fringes of society, for those who live among alleged “terrorists,” 
and for those who live under a de facto regime led by “terrorists”—the 
individuals that aid groups most often assist.23 
Consider Lebanon, where Hezbollah, a Shiite militant group the 
U.S. government classifies as an FTO, can be the most efficient vehicle 
for distributing aid to Lebanese towns and villages in the south of the 
country.24  In a 2006 battle between Israel and Hezbollah, international 
relief agencies receiving financing from the U.S. government struggled 
to dole out food and medicine to villagers living on the front lines 
without running afoul of § 2339B.25  While the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) made efforts to funnel aid appropriately and 
legally, many in the area acknowledged that coordination with 
Hezbollah was almost impossible to avoid if they wanted to distribute 
aid as widely as needed.26 
To escape getting caught in § 2339B’s web, humanitarian aid groups 
must receive more guidance when determining whether the 
                                               
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 892. 
 23. See SARA PANTULIANO ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST., COUNTER-TERRORISM AND 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION:  TENSIONS, IMPACT AND WAYS FORWARD 3 (2011) (comparing the 
counterterrorism laws of several nations and describing the U.S. material support statutes as 
“by far the law with the greatest potential adverse impact on humanitarian organisations”). 
 24. See Robert F. Worth & Hassan M. Fattah, Aiding Civilians, Without Helping 
Hezbollah, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/23/ 
world/africa/23iht-aid.2571304.html (“Though Hezbollah is only one of many social 
service groups in Lebanon, its reputation for delivering services honestly is 
unmatched, making it that much harder to circumvent.”). 
 25. Id.  Though the effort to distribute humanitarian supplies was slowed, the 
government did not prosecute any U.S. aid groups for violating § 2339B. 
 26. Id. (quoting an aid worker as saying, “We clearly cannot and would not have 
any contact with Hezbollah’s military wing, or its social services arm . . . .  But can we 
work with people elected under its political banner?  That is a gray area.”). 
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individuals they assist are part of an FTO.  It is often critical that 
humanitarian supplies reach individuals as swiftly and efficiently as 
possible, and clarity from the courts would answer many questions 
NGOs have about common scenarios they face.  Indeed, the lack of 
clarity and the broad scope of § 2339B have created a type of “chilling 
effect” on humanitarian aid groups, many times muffling their 
advocacy and stymieing their support.27  Aid groups fear prosecution 
for accidentally providing aid to an individual with ties to an FTO, 
which has even led some to reconsider providing humanitarian 
assistance at all.28  This is particularly concerning for aid groups active 
in war-torn areas—precisely where aid is often most needed.29 
This Comment argues that the test developed by the district court in 
Jama is flawed because it failed to consider domestic and international 
doctrines that have already decided issues analogous to § 2339B’s FTO 
question.  Instead of focusing on a “significant activity” test, the proper 
test should incorporate principles and lessons from international 
humanitarian law and terrorist sanctioning regimes to provide much-
needed clarity on who is part of an FTO under § 2339B.  Part I provides 
the background and congressional history of § 2339B, including the 
atmosphere within the United States when Congress enacted the 
statute in 1996.  Part II considers the negative impact that § 2339B has 
had on humanitarian aid operations globally.  Part III analyzes the test 
created by the Jama court, and Part IV then critiques the Jama test and 
considers how other tests from domestic and international law could 
apply in the § 2339B context.  This Comment concludes by providing 
a recommendation for a new test that courts could employ, with a 
                                               
 27. See generally Sam Adelsberg et al., The Chilling Effect of the “Material Support” Law 
on Humanitarian Aid:  Causes, Consequences, and Proposed Reforms, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY 
J. 282, 282–83 (2013) (describing a 2011 incident in east Africa when U.S. aid 
organizations were hesitant to provide relief to famine victims because they were in 
areas controlled by a militant group and feared prosecution for providing famine aid 
in those areas). 
 28. See infra Part II (describing several instances in which fear of prosecution under 
a material support statute has either prevented an NGO from providing aid to 
individuals or forced an NGO to cancel a potential aid program). 
 29. See, e.g., Adelsberg et al., supra note 27, at 283, 296–97 (describing a situation 
where “a tsunami hit Sri Lanka in 2004[ and] aid was reportedly hampered in regions 
controlled by the [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] because organizations knew that 
any provision of humanitarian aid within those regions would expose them to criminal 
liability,” and thus the provisions of medical supplies “failed to address the increasingly 
pressing needs of the affected populations for food, clothing, water, and sanitation”). 
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particular eye toward smoothing encounters between humanitarian 
organizations and U.S. counterterrorism laws. 
I.  § 2339B AND CONGRESS’S EFFORT TO ERADICATE  
TERRORIST FINANCING 
On April 19, 1995, a truck filled with explosives detonated in front 
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, killing 168 individuals and injuring hundreds more.30  The 
blast was the deadliest act of domestic terrorism committed on U.S. soil 
and served as a catalyst for broad-sweeping legislative proposals 
intended to ensure that such an act would never occur again.31  
Congress enacted one such proposal—the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)32—on the one-year anniversary of 
the bombing and included within it one of the most far-reaching 
federal anti-terrorism statutes in the United States:  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B.33  While different anti-terrorism legislative proposals had 
been in the works over the years,34 § 2339B’s approach to mens rea 
marked a departure from previously enacted anti-terrorism laws.35  
Instead of requiring that a defendant providing material support to an 
FTO had intent to facilitate a terrorist act, § 2339B only required proof 
                                               
 30. See Pierre Thomas, McVeigh Friend Takes Plea Deal, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 1995), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/oklahoma/stories/ 
ok080995.htm. 
 31. See Katharine Q. Seelye, House Committee Passes Anti-Terrorism Measure, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 21, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/21/us/house-committee-
passes-anti-terrorism-measure.html (noting that the bill was under consideration for 
several months, but the terrorist attack added urgency). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered 
sections in 8, 18, 22, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).  AEDPA’s goal is to “deter terrorism, provide 
justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes.”  Id. 
at 1214.  Upon signing AEDPA, President Bill Clinton stated, “It stands as a tribute to 
the victims of terrorism and to the men and women in law enforcement who dedicate 
their lives to protecting all of us from the scourge of terrorist activity.”  Presidential 
Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 721 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
 34. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:  Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 4–21 (2005) (outlining the multitude of 
anti-terrorism laws proposed in Congress in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 35. See id. at 18 (distinguishing between § 2339B and § 2339A based on § 2339B’s 
broad language, which “would seem on its face to prohibit the provision of the same 
kinds of aid under any circumstances irrespective of the provider’s intent or belief 
about how the recipient will use it”). 
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that the defendant had knowledge that the organization was an FTO.36  
Congress made this change in response to fears that previous anti-
terrorism statutes had left open a gap that allowed individuals to 
lawfully make a charitable donation to an FTO, which the FTO could 
then use for terrorism purposes instead.  Though Congress enacted 
§ 2339B with broad language to ensure it closed this gap, it has since 
amended and clarified the statute several times to avoid vagueness 
challenges.  As it stands now, the U.S. Secretary of State still has broad 
authority to designate organizations as FTOs, but the ability of courts 
to interpret § 2339B has narrowed in a few key respects. 
A.  § 2339B:  Background & Purpose 
A primary congressional motivation in enacting § 2339B without the 
intent requirement was to address concerns about an economic 
loophole that § 2339A left open.  Congress enacted § 2339A only two 
years prior to § 2339B as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994,37 a lengthy bill of legislative crime-control 
reforms.38  In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,39 
§ 2339A criminalized providing “material support”40 for the 
                                               
 36. § 2339B(a)(1). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12643 (2012)). 
 38. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333, TERRORIST MATERIAL 
SUPPORT:  AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B 1 n.3 (2010) (describing the bill 
as a “[355-]page amalgam of legislative proposals consisting of [33] separate titles 
which included Cop on the Beat grants, the Violence Against Women Act, revival of 
the death penalty as a federal sentencing alternative, a ban on assault weapons, DNA 
identification, and crime victims’ rights”). 
 39. On February 26, 1993, a group of terrorists with close ties to Khaled Sheikh 
Mohammed, considered the mastermind of 9/11, drove a van packed with explosives 
into the World Trade Center’s underground garage; the ensuing blast killed six and 
injured hundreds more.  See Benjamin Weiser, The Trade Center Verdict:  The Overview; 
“Mastermind” and Driver Found Guilty in 1993 Plot to Blow Up Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 13, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/13/nyregion/trade-center-
verdict-overview-mastermind-driver-found-guilty-1993-plot-blow-up.html. 
 40. The definition of “material support or resources” has remained a point of 
controversy since its inclusion in the law and, following a flurry of lawsuits questioning 
the constitutionality of the phrase, was amended to address vagueness concerns.  See 
Aiding Terrorists:  An Examination of the Material Support Statute:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 128–30 (2004) (statement of Robert M. Chesney, 
Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law).  The current 
definition of “material support” is 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
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commission of specific violent crimes by terrorists when the individual 
providing support knew or intended that the material support would 
be used “in preparation for, or in carrying out” an act of terrorism.41  
Section 2339A’s critics complained that the statute left open a 
loophole that allowed terrorist groups to potentially raise money in the 
United States under the guise of charity.42  In other words, under 
§ 2339A, an individual could legally donate money to a terrorist 
organization so long as the donor believed the money would be spent 
on a terrorist organization’s political or social services instead of on 
acts of terrorism.43 
One year after § 2339A’s passage, the overall devastation, loss of life, 
and public shock following the Oklahoma City bombing generated a 
renewed surge of public interest in congressional proposals on anti-
terrorism laws44 and reinforced criticisms of the loophole in § 2339A.  
Within minutes of the bombing, media reports widely speculated that 
it was the work of Muslim extremists,45 despite the arrest of the 
                                               
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel ([one] or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 
§ 2339A(b)(1). 
 41. § 2339A(a).  The list of designated offenses covers any of the federal terrorism 
crimes, including domestic terrorist acts.  Id. 
 42. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43 (1995) (“Many of these organizations operate 
under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise, or are wrapped in the 
blanket of religion.  They use the mantle of religion to protect themselves from 
scrutiny, and thus operate largely without fear of recrimination.”); see also Chesney, 
supra note 34, at 13 (describing criticism of § 2339A, such as the difficulty of proving 
that resources given to charity or religious groups were in fact being funneled to 
terrorist organizations). 
 43. See Chesney, supra note 34, at 13. 
 44. Id. at 15; see, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, House Committee Passes Anti-Terrorism 
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/21/us/ 
house-committee-passes-anti-terrorism-measure.html (“Although the package had 
been in the works for several months, the April 19 bombing in Oklahoma City [gave] 
the bill added urgency.”); see also 142 CONG. REC. 7972 (1996) (statement of Hon. Don 
Young) (commenting that AEDPA was simply “a knee-jerk reaction to a most heinous 
crime”). 
 45. See, e.g., Yaser Ali, Comment, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia Is 
Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1041 (2012) (“[T]he 
Arab terrorist stereotype was so entrenched that even after Timothy McVeigh . . . had 
been arrested . . . CNN’s Wolf Blitzer reported ‘there is still a possibility that there 
could have been some sort of connection to Middle East terrorism . . . .’”); Jim 
Naureckas, The Oklahoma City Bombing:  The Jihad That Wasn’t, FAIR (July 1, 1995), 
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bomber, Timothy McVeigh—a white, Christian male—just ninety 
minutes after the attack.46  The public immediately focused its scrutiny 
onto Islamic communities within the United States, fiercely 
questioning and targeting Muslim non-profits and mosques as possible 
sources of financial support for the bombing.47  Fabricated though it 
was, this exact scenario seemed to confirm § 2339A critics’ warnings. 
In response to the outcry, Congress enacted § 2339B.48  The statute’s 
remedy to the supposed loophole extended criminal liability by 
outlawing provisions of “material support” to FTOs without requiring 
that the defendant have additional intent that those funds be used to 
further terrorism in any way.49  As the House committee report 
explained at the time, § 2339B 
recognizes the fungibility of financial resources and other types of 
material support.  Allowing an individual to supply funds, goods, or 
services to an organization, or to any of its subgroups that draw 
significant funding from the main organization’s treasury, helps 
defray the cost to the terrorist organization of running the ostensibly 
legitimate activities.  This in turn frees an equal sum that can then 
be spent on terrorist activities.50 
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has used § 2339B’s broad reach to 
prosecute many of the most prominent and well-known terrorism cases.51 
                                               
http://fair.org/extra/the-oklahoma-city-bombing (compiling examples of news 
reports that assumed ties between the Oklahoma bombing and Islamic terrorism). 
 46. See Hailey Branson-Potts, After Oklahoma City Bombing, McVeigh’s Arrest Almost 
Went Unnoticed, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-oklahoma-city-bombing-20150419-story.html. 
 47. See, e.g., Todd J. Gillman, FBI Looks into Islamic Fund Raising:  Muslim Officials 
Deny Supporting Terrorism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 18, 1994, at 29A, 1994 WLNR 
5016732. 
 48. See Chesney, supra note 34, at 17 (noting that § 2339B was enacted in haste to 
meet the deadline of the one-year anniversary of the bombing).  Even before the 
passage of § 2339B, President Clinton used his executive authority to narrow § 2339A’s 
gap by imposing sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2012), targeting terrorist organizations and their members.  
Chesney, supra note 34, at 13. 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); see also infra Section I.C (defining “foreign terrorist 
organization” as a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity, which 
threatens the security of the United States). 
 50. H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 81 (1995). 
 51. See Benjamin J. Priester, Who Is a “Terrorist”?  Drawing the Line Between Criminal 
Defendants and Military Enemies, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1255, 1266 (discussing § 2339B 
prosecutions of the “Lackawanna Six,” an alleged al-Qaeda “sleeper cell” in upstate 
New York, and John Walker Lindh, called the “American Taliban” for his alleged 
involvement with the Taliban in Afghanistan). 
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B.  § 2339B:  Statutory Language 
Section 2339B has faced several challenges to its constitutionality 
since its enactment—including criticisms that certain elements were 
overbroad and vague—and Congress has adjusted its language to 
address these and other concerns.52  In its current form, § 2339B reads: 
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, 
or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned 
for any term of years or for life.  To violate this paragraph, a person 
must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist 
organization . . . , that the organization has engaged or engages in 
terrorist activity . . . , or that the organization has engaged or 
engages in terrorism . . . .53 
The definition of “material support” is expansive and includes 
providing training, financial services, expert advice or assistance, and 
personnel.54  Terms within “material support” have also been defined 
to add more clarity, including a separate, more refined definition of 
what it means to provide “personnel.”55  With this expansive definition 
of “material support,” the prosecution can obtain a conviction under 
§ 2339B based on actions as far ranging as “raising $300 for Al Shabaab” 
to “attempting to provide anti-aircraft missiles for Al Qaeda.”56 
Elimination of the requirement that a defendant intend to further 
terrorist activities means that a judge or jury need only find two things 
to convict a defendant under § 2339B:  (1) the accused knowingly 
attempted to provide or provided “material support” to an FTO;57 and 
                                               
 52. For example, the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 amended the section by 
increasing the maximum sentence lengths and adding “expert advice or assistance” to 
the definition of “material support.”  See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 38, at 2; see also supra 
note 40 (discussing the controversy surrounding the term “material support” and 
whether its terms were overly vague). 
 53. § 2339B(a)(1). 
 54. § 2339A(b)(1); see also supra note 40 (discussing the definition of  “material support”). 
 55. See infra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (defining “personnel” as 
individuals who “work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or . . . 
organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization”). 
 56. TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 12, at 20; see also Adam Liptak, The 
Year in Ideas; Material Support, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 15, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/15/magazine/the-year-in-ideas-material-
support.html (“[P]rosecutors have realized that the provision is written so broadly that 
almost any kind of support can be defined as illegal.”). 
 57. § 2339B(a)(1); see also United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 129 (2d Cir. 
2011) (dismissing the defendants’ invitation to read a scienter requirement of “specific 
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(2) the accused knew that the beneficiary of the support was either 
engaged in terrorism or was an FTO.58 
C. FTO Designation Process 
Because a necessary element of a § 2339B charge is that the 
defendant provided material support to an FTO or an organization 
engaged in “terrorism” or “terrorist activities,” confirming the 
organization’s status is a critical first step in prosecution.59  Congress 
has given the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Attorney General, the power to designate foreign 
organizations as FTOs under section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).60  To do this, the Secretary of State compiles an 
administrative record containing classified and non-classified materials to 
demonstrate that the foreign organization meets the statutory criteria.61 
There are three statutory criteria for FTO designation.  First, there 
must be “substantial support”62 in the Secretary of State’s 
administrative record that the group is indeed a “foreign 
                                               
intent” into § 2339B because Congress “chose knowledge about the organization’s 
connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organizations terrorist 
activity” (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 2 (2010))). 
 58. § 2339B(a)(1); see also United States v. Omar, 786 F.3d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 
2015) (noting that the government’s burden to prove material support to an FTO 
includes knowledge that an individual was dealing with an organization that is 
“engaged or engages in terrorist activity,” or knowledge that the organization 
“engaged or engages in terrorism”). 
 59. Critically, a § 2339B defendant also cannot assert as a defense that the 
Secretary of State improperly designated the organization as an FTO.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1189(a)(8) (2012) (“If a designation under this subsection has become effective 
under paragraph (2)(B) a defendant in a criminal action or an alien in a removal 
proceeding shall not be permitted to raise any question concerning the validity of the 
issuance of such designation as a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing.”); see 
also Aiding Terrorists—An Examination of the Material Support Statute:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (testimony of David Cole, Professor of 
Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) [hereinafter Testimony of David Cole], 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=c
ong (“Section 2339B, if construed not to require that kind of specific intent to further 
the terrorist activity of the group, imposes guilt by association, in violation of the First 
Amendment, and in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 60. 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
 61. § 1189(a)(3)(B). 
 62. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (holding that the administrative record contained “substantial support” that 
a Sri Lankan separatist group was an FTO because of evidence that it engaged in 
bombing and killing to further their political goals). 
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organization.”63  Second, the organization must “engage[] in terrorist 
activity . . . or terrorism . . . , or retain[] the capability and intent to 
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.”64  Third, the organization’s 
terrorist activity must threaten the “security of [U.S.] nationals or the 
national security of the [United States]” as a whole.65 
FTO designation has significant legal ramifications.  Under § 2339B, 
any individual who “knowingly provides material support or resources 
to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so,” 
faces up to twenty years in prison or, if death results from the FTO’s 
use of the material support, life imprisonment.66  Additionally, once 
the designation takes effect, FTO members may not travel to the 
United States or may be removable from the United States if they are 
already in the country.67  American financial institutions must also take 
control over any funds they know have ties to an FTO and report the 
funds to the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.68 
The Secretary of State also determines if there exists a statutory 
exemption for an FTO to receive certain types of support.  Section 
2339B carves out two exceptions for those providing medicine or religious 
materials;69 however, it includes no explicit exception for humanitarian 
                                               
 63. § 1189(a)(1)(A).  The Secretary of State likely narrowly interprets the term 
“foreign organization.”  See Joshua A. Ellis, Comment, Designation of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations Under the AEDPA:  The National Council Court Erred in Requiring Pre-
Designation Process, 2002 BYU L. REV. 675, 678.  For example, in Nat’l Council of Resistance 
of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the U.S. government conceded 
that a group organized under the laws of the District of Columbia could not be an 
FTO.  Id. at 201–02; Brief for Respondents at 28, Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. 
Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439), 2000 WL 35576228, at *28; see 
also Ellis, supra, at 679 (highlighting the U.S. Code’s failure to define “foreign 
organization” but noting that the Secretary of State interprets the term “foreign 
organization narrowly). 
 64. § 1189(a)(1)(B).  Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA defines “terrorist activity” 
as any unlawful activity that involves such activities as assassinations, the use of 
biological weapons, and violent attacks.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(IV).  To 
“engage” in the defined terrorist activity, an individual must “commit or . . . incite to 
commit” a terrorist activity, “prepare or plan a terrorist activity,” solicit funds or 
individuals for an organization, or “commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably 
should know, affords material support.”  § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)–(VI). 
 65. § 1189(a)(1)(C).  Under the statute, “national security” encompasses the “national 
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.”  § 1189(d)(2). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
 67. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)–(V), 1227(a)(1)(A). 
 68. § 1189(a)(2)(C). 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (excluding “medicine” and “religious materials” from 
the definition of “material support”). 
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resources broadly.70  Instead, the Secretary of State may approve 
exemptions for humanitarian aid in the form of “training,” 
“personnel,” and “expert advice or assistance” in situations where aid 
will not be used to carry out terrorist activity.71  No humanitarian aid 
exemption appears to have been approved by the Secretary of State in 
the more than twenty years since § 2339B’s enactment.72  However, the 
Secretary of State did extend a type of “good faith” exemption in August 
2011 to U.S. aid groups providing aid to famine victims in Somalia.73 
II.  § 2339B’S IMPACT ON HUMANITARIAN AID GROUPS 
Since Congress enacted § 2339B, many charitable organizations 
have decried its counterterrorism measures and its adverse effects on 
humanitarian aid.74  In regions where FTOs operate, U.S. anti-
terrorism laws often dissuade humanitarian organizations from 
providing aid for fear of unintentionally helping an individual with ties 
                                               
 70. See supra note 40 (noting that the only exceptions within “material support” 
are either “medicine or religious materials”). 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (“No person may be prosecuted under this section in 
connection with the term ‘personnel’, ‘training’, or ‘expert advice or assistance’ if the 
provision of that material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization was 
approved by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Attorney General.  The 
Secretary of State may not approve the provision of any material support that may be 
used to carry out terrorist activity . . . .”). 
 72. See GUINANE ET AL., CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK, SAFEGUARDING HUMANITARIANISM 
IN ARMED CONFLICT:  A CALL FOR RECONCILING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND 
COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2012), 
http://www.charityandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/Safeguarding%20Humanitari
anism%20Final.pdf (noting in reference to the humanitarian exemption that, “[t]o 
our knowledge, this power has not been invoked”). 
 73. Background Briefing on Somalia and Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. DEP’T 
ST. (Aug. 2, 2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/spbr/2011/169479.htm. 
 74. See generally Adelsberg et al., supra note 27, at 293 (detailing the “chilling 
effects” the material support statutes have had on humanitarian assistance abroad, 
including leading some organizations to reconsider providing humanitarian aid).  A 
majority of these criticisms concern the overarching reach of the “material support” 
definition, especially in the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16 
(2010) (examining the definition of “material support” and holding that it was not 
unconstitutionally vague, did not constitute an abridgement of the First Amendment 
right to free speech, and did not impermissibly intrude on the right of free 
association).  These concerns equally apply to the lack of clarification on who courts 
deem to be part of an FTO. 
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to an FTO.75  In many areas, the designated FTOs are not merely 
“terrorist groups”—they are also the de facto government of the 
territory or region, providing services that include health care, education, 
business, and law enforcement.76  This creates a nearly impossible 
situation when disaster strikes, and humanitarian aid organizations face 
the dilemma of either providing life-saving aid and risking prosecution 
under U.S. counterterrorism laws or doing nothing at all. 
In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami that ravaged southeast Asia, 
close to 40,000 Sri Lankans lost their lives.77  Amid the destruction, aid 
agencies could not effectively operate in northeastern Sri Lanka for 
fear of prosecution for interacting with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), a separatist group that sought the creation of an 
independent Tamil state.78  A designated FTO, the LTTE engaged in 
terrorist tactics throughout its history, including notoriously 
“pioneering” the use of suicide bomb jackets.79  Yet the LTTE also 
served as the de-facto government for northeastern Sri Lanka and 
provided many of the social services in the area.80  Because of the 
group’s prevalence in the region, reaching people in the northeast 
ultimately required aid groups to operate in areas controlled by the 
FTO.81  After the tsunami struck Sri Lanka, the anti-terrorism laws 
arguably prevented much-needed aid from reaching millions of 
                                               
 75. See GUINANE ET AL., supra note 72, at 55 (explaining that while not all contact 
with an FTO is prohibited, the severe penalties for providing aid to FTOs dissuade aid 
organizations in certain contexts). 
 76. See, e.g., Justin A. Fraterman, Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief:  Are U.S. Material 
Support for Terrorism Laws Compatible with International Humanitarian Law?, 46 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 399, 402 (2014) (describing the situation where an FTO operated as 
the de facto government of northeastern Sri Lanka during the country’s civil war). 
 77. Charles Haviland, Sri Lanka Recovers Seven Years After Its Tsunami, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12806874. 
 78. Implementation of the USA PATRIOT ACT:  Prohibition of Material Support Under 
Sections 805 of the USA Patriot Act and 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 25–28 (2005) (statement of Ahilan 
Arulanantham). 
 79. See Preeti Bhattacharji, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (aka Tamil Tigers) (Sri 
Lanka, Separatists), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 20, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/ separatist-
terrorism/liberation-tigers-tamil-eelam-aka-tamil-tigers-sri-lanka-separatists/p9242 (crediting 
hundreds of suicide attacks and more than 70,000 deaths to the LTTE). 
 80. See generally Fraterman, supra note 76, at 402 (listing the services the LTTE 
provided to the local populace in northeastern Sri Lanka, including health and law 
enforcement services). 
 81. Id. at 402–03 (noting that millions of affected individuals were likely unable to 
receive aid). 
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people in the disaster zone because the U.S. aid organizations did not 
want to risk criminal prosecution and asset seizure.82  Some aid groups 
reportedly either scaled back their provisions in LTTE-controlled 
regions or limited their provisions to only medical care, which § 2339B 
excepts from coverage.83 
Though disaster situations exacerbate § 2339B’s obstacles to 
humanitarian aid distribution, the statute also affects long-term 
development work.  During a 2009 hunger crisis in Somalia, for 
example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
provided funds for NGOs to drill wells in severely affected areas; however, 
USAID also proposed that NGOs monitor whether al-Shabaab members 
drank from those wells and then report on al-Shabaab’s use of the wells 
to the U.S. government.84  The proposed requirement was impossible 
for the NGOs to implement—al-Shabaab is an FTO battling the Somali 
government for control of the country, and it is a prominent force in 
many rural areas85—so the NGOs could not proceed.86 
Thus, without any guidance from courts or Congress on what legal 
showing is sufficient to deem individuals part of an FTO, well-
intentioned donors and charitable organizations seeking to distribute 
aid are left to their best guess.  All too often, the result of this lack of 
guidance is either failure to distribute emergency aid to certain regions 
or elimination of a long-term development project. 
                                               
 82. See AHILAN T. ARULANANTHAM, AM. CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, 
“A HUNGRY CHILD KNOWS NO POLITICS:”  A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF THE LAWS 
GOVERNING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND “MATERIAL SUPPORT” OF TERRORISM 2–6 (2008), 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Arulanantham%20Issue%20Brief.pdf.  See generally 
Fraterman, supra note 76, at 402 (discussing the difficulties the material support 
statutes created for charitable organizations in the aftermath of the tsunami). 
 83. See Adelsberg et al., supra note 27, at 297 (noting that the medical care failed 
to address more pressing concerns such as lack of food and water). 
 84. See GUINANE ET AL., supra note 72, at 56 (describing the monitoring request as 
an “extreme measure[]” by the U.S. government). 
 85. See Who Are Somalia’s al-Shabaab?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689 (reporting that al-Shabaab has 
carried out terrorist attacks in Somalia and Kenya and is still a threat despite being 
pushed out of most of the territory it once controlled). 
 86. See GUINANE ET AL., supra note 72, at 56 (“This broad reading of the material 
support law denied civilians in an entire village a basic necessity, based solely on the 
listed group’s presence in the region.”). 
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III.  WHO IS A “TERRORIST”? 
Answering the question of who is considered a terrorist is complex, 
and even though the answer is crucial, several aspects of § 2339B 
remain hotly contested.87  Will delivering tsunami aid to the brother of 
an LTTE member in Sri Lanka put a humanitarian organization in 
jeopardy, even if the brother has never directly taken part in a terrorist 
act?  Does providing food and water to an individual starving during a 
famine equate to providing aid to the organization as a whole?88  What 
avenues for delivering aid are available to charitable organizations 
operating in territories where the de facto government is an FTO?  
Donors and charitable organizations must have guidance on who is 
tied to a designated FTO and who is not, especially considering the 
threat of hefty sentences, including life imprisonment,89 and the far-
reaching adverse effects on aid delivery.90 
The district court in Jama directly addressed the issue of what 
comprises sufficient ties to an FTO under § 2339B.91  However, given 
the swift dismissal the court gave to the parties’ counterarguments,92 
                                               
 87. See Testimony of David Cole, supra note 59, at 2–3 (arguing that material 
support statutes “impose guilt by association,” are “vague and overbroad,” and give 
“the executive branch unfettered discretion in labeling political groups as terrorist 
groups”).  See generally Fraterman, supra note 76, at 417–18 (noting the difficulties that 
come with requiring aid workers to know if their aid is going to an FTO). 
 88. The Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit have construed the term “medicine,” 
excepted in § 2339B, differently.  Compare United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 143 
(2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he medicine exception . . . shields only those who provide 
substances qualifying as medicine to terrorist organizations.  Other medical support, 
such as volunteering to serve as an on-call doctor for a terrorist organization, 
constitutes a provision of personnel and/or scientific assistance proscribed by law.”), 
with Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 699 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc) (holding that “medicine” should be broadly construed to include the 
provision of medical services). 
 89. Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 704, 129 Stat. 268, 300 (2015) (amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(a)(1)). 
 90. See supra Part II (discussing § 2339B’s implications on humanitarian aid delivery). 
 91. United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882, 892 (E.D. Va. 2016) (articulating a 
seven-factor test to determine what constitutions sufficient ties under § 2339B). 
 92. Defendants contended that they were not under the “command and control” 
of the FTO, that they were not members of the FTO, that the FTO was different from 
“domestic criminal organizations,” and that a definition regarding who is part of an 
FTO must accommodate the First Amendment.  Id. at 891.  In its analysis, the Court 
addressed these counterarguments and found the parties’ in violation of § 2339B.  Id. 
at 891, 893, 895. 
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the court’s flawed reading of § 2339B’s congressional history,93 and its 
failure to adequately understand the nuances of terrorist activity,94 it is 
prudent to consider other laws and sanctioning regimes that have 
answered analogous questions.  These comparative structures—from 
domestic law, international law, the United Nations, and the U.S. State 
Department—provide alternative models to help answer the complex 
question of who belongs to an FTO. 
A.  The Jama Court’s Opinion 
Twenty years after Congress passed § 2339B, the federal district 
court in Jama addressed whether individuals receiving material support 
from defendants accused of violating § 2339B were part of an FTO.  
The court eventually found the defendants guilty of providing material 
support to al-Shabaab, a designated FTO.95  However, the defendants’ 
arguments pushed the court to create an original test to determine the 
requisite level of involvement an individual must have with an FTO to 
be deemed part of that FTO under § 2339B.96 
In the court’s reading of § 2339B, an individual has provided 
material support or resources “to” an FTO under § 2339B “if that 
person delivers material support or resources intended for an FTO, 
either directly or through conduits, to someone who is deemed a part 
of the FTO.”97  The defendants in the case did not dispute that they 
intended to provide some material support to al-Shabaab in limited, 
exempted ways.98  They did contend, though, that their fundraising 
activities in online chatrooms and monetary transmissions were done 
through individuals “who supported, but were entirely independent of,” al-
Shabaab, and therefore, the government had not established a prima 
facie case against them in this respect.99 
The resulting question before the court was whether the individuals 
who received the contributions from the defendants were sufficiently 
connected with al-Shabaab, and the court recognized that it had 
                                               
 93. See infra Section IV.A (analyzing the Jama test and determining that it gives the 
judiciary too much discretion in deciding who it deems part of an FTO). 
 94. See infra Section IV.A.2 (critiquing the Jama court’s “significant activity” test 
and finding it added little clarity to the already ambiguous concept of “terrorism”). 
 95. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 895. 
 96. Id. at 892. 
 97. Id. at 887. 
 98. Id. at 890 (stating that the defendants argued their funds would only be used 
to provide medical care, which is excepted under § 2339B). 
 99. Id. at 888, 890 (emphasis added). 
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“surprisingly little case law” to act as precedent or even guidance to 
formulate an answer.100  The court found no opinion from the 
Supreme Court or any appellate-level court explicitly addressing the 
issue of what showing is legally sufficient under § 2339B for a court to 
deem an individual part of an FTO.101  In lieu of precedent, the court 
first addressed both the defendants’ and government’s proposed tests. 
1. The defendants’ arguments and U.N. sanctioning regimes 
The defendants asserted that the individual in question must be a 
part of a “command and control” leadership structure within the 
FTO102 and, based on analogous U.N. sanctioning designations, a 
“member” of the FTO, as opposed to merely a “supporter,” “financier,” 
or “facilitator.”103  Though the defendants did not reference particular 
sanctioning regimes in their closing argument briefs,104 one example 
they could have referenced to highlight the risks of creating a broad 
FTO definition is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267.105  Almost 
since its inception in 1999, Resolution 1267—which designated Osama 
bin Laden, his “associates,” and the Taliban as terrorists and subjected 
them to a series of sanctions106—has been plagued with criticism.107  
The criticisms have centered around due process concerns regarding 
the fairness and accuracy of the listing process.108 
                                               
 100. Id. at 890. 
 101. Id. (“It appears that no decision of the Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, or any 
other circuit court has addressed explicitly what showing is legally adequate to 
constitute . . . material support to an FTO under [§] 2339B.”). 
 102. Id. at 891. 
 103. Id.  Separately, the defendants argued that the new legal test should 
accommodate the First Amendment rights of advocacy and association, including the 
protection of financial donations as speech.  Id.  The court held that § 2339B punishes 
conduct, not speech, and easily dismissed the defendant’s proposed “non-speech 
protected overt act” requirement.  Id. at 894. 
 104. Closing Arguments of Defendant Hinda Osman Dhirane at 29–30, United 
States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882 (E.D. Va. 2016) (No. 1:14cr230-AJT). 
 105. S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 106. Id. ¶ 4. 
 107. See, e.g., Abdelrazik v. Canada, [2010] 1 F.C.R. 267 para. 53 (Can.) (“The 1267 
Committee regime is . . . a situation for a listed person not unlike that of Josef K. in 
Kafka’s The Trial, who awakens one morning and, for reasons never revealed to him or 
the reader, is arrested and prosecuted for an unspecified crime.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council:  
Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 297 (2008) (noting the 
concern is how the Security Council and the 1267 Committee have gone about freezing 
assets and not that they have frozen assets at all). 
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In 2005, Resolution 1617 modified 1267’s reach to include al-
Qaeda.109  Resolution 1617 provided an extremely broad definition of 
what constitutes “associat[ion] with” al-Qaeda:  those who (1) “otherwise” 
support al-Qaeda’s activities “or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or 
derivative thereof,” even if they do not engage in any “financing, 
planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating” of terrorism; (2) recruit 
for al-Qaeda; or (3) supply, sell, or transfer arms to al-Qaeda.110  This 
definition placed the focus on association with an organization—not 
on the commission of specific acts.  While not uncommon in post-9/11 
counterterrorism laws, many were concerned that this focus led to 
inaccurate listings based on little or low-quality information.111 
In response to these critiques, the United Nations has adopted 
numerous corrective measures to increase transparency and accuracy, 
though none have completely quieted the concerns.112  In 2015, the 
Security Council included one of these measures in Resolution 2253, 
which lists individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).113  Resolution 2253 
narrowed the criteria to focus on an individual’s or entity’s specific acts 
in furtherance of terrorism instead of relying on 1617’s generic 
“association” criteria.  There are now three listing criteria for 
placement on 2253’s sanctions list114: 
                                               
 109. S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 1 (July 29, 2005). 
 110. Id. ¶ 2. 
 111. For example, in 2001, three Somali men challenged their Resolution 1267 
listing, which was based on U.S. intelligence.  Peter Gutherie, Note, Security Council 
Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491, 511 
(2004).  When asked for further information on the reason for their listing, the U.S. 
government produced a twenty-seven-page document, twenty-three pages of which 
were news reports.  See id. at 512; see also Kent Roach, The Eroding Distinctions Between 
Intelligence and Evidence in Terrorism Investigations, in COUNTER-TERRORISM AND BEYOND:  
THE CULTURE OF LAW AND JUSTICE AFTER 9/11 48, 50–54 (Nicola McGarrity et al. eds., 
2010) (describing the tension between intelligence, which aims to identify suspect 
associations, and evidence, which aims to prove guilty acts and minds). 
 112. See generally GEORGE A. LOPEZ ET AL., KROC INST. FOR INT’L PEACE STUDIES, 
OVERDUE PROCESS:  PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE SANCTIONING ALLEGED 
TERRORISTS 2, 12–13 (2009), https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/16501 (providing a 
brief summary of procedural changes instituted by the Security Council). 
 113. S.C. Res. 2253, ¶ 45 (Dec. 17, 2015). 
 114. See U.N. Sec. Council, Sanctions List Materials, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2017) (containing the names of all individuals and entities on the Resolution 
2253 sanctions list).  This process is administered by a sanctions committee made up 
of members of the Security Council, which has listed hundreds of individuals for 
sanctioning.  See U.N. Sec. Council, Press Releases, UNITED NATIONS, 
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(a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, 
or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under 
the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; 
(b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; 
[or] 
(c) Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-
Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative 
thereof.115 
Since the adoption of the resolution, individuals have been added 
to the sanctions list for actions ranging from raising money and 
transferring it to al-Qaeda116 to recruiting fighters for North Caucasus 
terrorist groups (many of which have pledged allegiance to ISIL)117 to 
claiming responsibility for assassinations.118 
2. The government’s argument and the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt 
Organizations Act 
The government in Jama, on the other hand, proposed a more 
“informal” test similar to the one courts use to determine whether an 
individual is part of an “enterprise” under the Racketeer Influence and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).119  Prosecuting terrorists under 
RICO is not a new concept.120  Though initially enacted to fight 
                                               
http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/press-releases (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2017) (aggregating press releases from the Resolution 1267 Committee). 
 115. S.C. Res. 2253, ¶ 3. 
 116. U.N. Sec. Council, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:  QDi.402 Nayif Salih 
Salim al-Qaysi, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/i
ndividual/nayif-salih-salim-al-qaysi. 
 117. U.N. Sec. Council, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:  QDi.397 Ayrat 
Nasimovich Vakhito, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/ 
en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/ayrat-nasimovich-
vakhitov; The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 
(Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.csis.org/events/north-caucasus-insurgency-and-syria. 
 118. U.N. Sec. Council, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:  QDi.375 Boubaker 
ben Habib ben al-Hakim, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.un.org/sc/ 
suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/boubaker-ben-
habib-ben-al-hakim. 
 119. United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882, 891 (E.D. Va. 2016); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961–1968 (2012). 
 120. See generally Priester, supra note 51, at 1255 (comparing federal criminal law 
and international law as possible frameworks for defining a terrorist).  Other than the 
obvious laws criminalizing direct involvement in the substantive unlawful acts 
themselves, prosecutors have successfully convicted individuals with terrorism-related 
charges under federal conspiracy laws.  See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 
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organized crime,121 the government uses RICO against alleged terrorist 
“enterprises,” aided in part by courts’ liberal reading of the statute.122 
A substantive RICO violation is conduct of an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity.123  Since its enactment, the Supreme 
Court has widened RICO’s applicability to various types of groups by 
holding that “the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be ‘liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.’”124  It was not until after 
the 9/11 attacks, however, that Congress officially extended the 
“enterprise” to encompass terrorist organizations by passing the USA 
PATRIOT ACT,125 which revised RICO’s “racketeering” activities to 
include acts of international terrorism.126 
RICO weaves a broad web.  It does not explicitly define the outer 
boundaries of the “enterprise” concept, but to establish the existence 
of an “enterprise,” the plaintiff must demonstrate there is a formal or 
informal group of individuals functioning as a unit toward a common 
purpose.127  The statute explains that an “‘enterprise’ includes any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, 
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not 
a legal entity.”128 
                                               
453, 456–57 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding Zacarias Moussaoui, the “twentieth hijacker,” 
guilty of conspiracy in the 9/11 plot); Jason Zengerie, Twentieth Hijacker, The, N.Y. MAG. 
(Aug. 27, 2011), http://nymag.com/news/9-11/10th-anniversary/twentieth-hijacker. 
 121. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 80–81 (1969) (explaining that RICO was enacted to 
address problems of infiltration of legitimate businesses by individuals connected with 
organized crime). 
 122. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (“RICO is to be 
read broadly.”).  Though supporters of the concept had written extensively before 
9/11, the 2001 attacks pushed RICO back into the spotlight.  President George W. 
Bush remarked upon the similarities in his address to a joint session of Congress nine 
days after 9/11 when he said “[a]l-Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime.  But 
its goal is not making money; [rather,] its goal is remaking the world . . . .”  Address 
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
 123. See, e.g., Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2016) (identifying 
the requisite factors to show a RICO violation after analyzing past case law). 
 124. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006)). 
 125. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of U.S. Code). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2012). 
 127. § 1962. 
 128. § 1961(4). 
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Although an “enterprise” may exist merely when a group of 
individuals jointly commit a RICO offense,129 courts have established 
the basic structure of an enterprise.  In Boyle v. United States,130 the 
Supreme Court clarified that an “enterprise must have at least three 
structural features:  a purpose, relationships among those associated 
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates 
to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”131  No “chain of command” or 
hierarchical structure is required, and “nothing in RICO exempts an 
enterprise whose associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by 
periods of quiescence.”132  However, to succeed on a RICO claim, a 
plaintiff must still establish that the defendants were central figures in 
the underlying scheme or conspiracy.133 
Despite the flexible reading of “enterprises” and prosecutors’ expanded 
use of RICO to include acts of international terrorism, the court in Jama did 
not engage this argument.134  It merely stated the government’s proposed 
test before moving on to its own analysis of the issue. 
3. The Jama court’s test 
The district court in Jama did not consider the defendants’ or the 
government’s proposals persuasive.  The court found that although 
the material support statute does not specifically address who is 
deemed part of an FTO, specific terms defined within § 2339B 
indicated congressional intent that courts “consider the nature of an 
individual’s actions broadly in relation to the overall goals of the 
terrorist organization.”135 
The court specifically looked at the statute’s definition of the term 
“personnel,”136 which is a type of prohibited “material support.”137  The 
statute defines “personnel” as individuals who “work under that 
                                               
 129. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Assocs., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 85, 100 (M.D. 
Pa. 1984) (agreeing with the majority of federal courts to construe RICO liberally). 
 130. 556 U.S. 938 (2009). 
 131. Id. at 946. 
 132. Id. at 948. 
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2012); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 
349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs’ RICO claim for failing 
to prove the defendants were central figures in a terrorism plot), reconsidered in part, 
392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), and aff’d, 714 
F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 134. United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882, 891 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 135. Id. at 891–92. 
 136. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h), (j). 
 137. § 2339A(b)(1).  For the full definition of “material support,” see supra note 40. 
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terrorist organization’s direction or control or . . . organize, manage, 
supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.”138  It 
includes one caveat:  “[i]ndividuals who act entirely independently of 
the [FTO] to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to 
be working under the [FTO’s] direction or control.”139  The court 
stated that “the specific exclusion in the definition of ‘personnel’ of 
individuals working ‘entirely independently’ and the specific inclusion 
of individuals whose activities involve organizing, managing, or 
supervising various operations (as well as those who operate under the 
FTO’s direction or control)” indicate that Congress intended § 2339B 
to apply to a broader reach of individuals than solely those under a 
command and control structure.140 
Thus, the court went on to hold that for an individual to be deemed 
part of an FTO under § 2339B, the individual must be “engaged in 
significant activity on behalf of an FTO relative to that FTO’s goals and 
objectives.”141  To remedy the vagueness of the phrase “significant 
activity,” the district court named seven nonexclusive factors a court 
should consider: 
(1) the nature of the assistance provided or received by the 
individual (whether lawful or unlawful) and how it benefitted the 
FTO or otherwise advanced its goals and objectives; (2) for what time 
period the support or resources were provided; (3) whether the 
individual undertakes his or her activities specifically and exclusively 
for the benefit of the FTO or whether the individual undertakes 
similar activities for other organizations or for the public at large; 
(4) the degree to which the individual’s actions are directed by or 
coordinated with others associated with the FTO or any of its 
generally recognized representatives; (5) the nature and extent of 
the individual’s contacts within the FTO or with others acting on 
behalf of the FTO, including access to the FTO’s leadership and to 
non-public information pertaining to the FTO’s activities; 
(6) whether the individual self-identifies with the FTO, represents 
himself or herself as being part of the FTO, or purports to act on 
behalf of the FTO; and (7) whether the individual is reliably 
identified as being part of an FTO by recognized international law 
enforcement or other organizations.142 
                                               
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 892. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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After dismissing both the government’s and the defendants’ 
proposed legal tests, the court applied its own seven-factor test and 
found that the defendants knowingly and willingly entered into an 
agreement to provide material support to individuals sufficiently 
connected to an FTO.143 
B.  Other “Terrorist Lists” 
To effectively identify whether an individual is linked to a terrorist 
organization, courts must move beyond the Jama test.  While the FTO 
list remains a symbolic counterterrorism tool because of its public role 
in prosecuting high-profile alleged terrorists under § 2339B, the U.S. 
government, other countries, and the United Nations keep numerous 
other “terrorist lists” that are instructive in determining whether an 
individual is sufficiently connected to a terrorist organization.144  These 
lists create a log of individuals or entities that the U.S. government or 
the United Nations determine are connected to terrorist activities; once 
included on a list, the government freezes that individual’s or entity’s 
assets.145  International humanitarian law (IHL) provides another set of 
potentially applicable doctrines.  Some international courts have even 
addressed the specific issue of whether an individual is sufficiently 
linked to a terrorist organization, though not under § 2339B. 
1.  “Specially designated terrorists” and “specially designated global terrorists” 
The most relevant domestic lists are the “specially designated 
terrorists” (SDT) list and the “specially designated global terrorists” 
(SDGT) list, both of which the executive branch created to block terrorist 
financing.146  The legal authority for the U.S. government’s SDT and 
SDGT lists is found in the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA).147  The IEEPA authorizes the President to freeze the 
assets of “any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country 
                                               
 143. Id. at 893. 
 144. See, e.g., AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120, THE “FTO 
LIST” AND CONGRESS:  SANCTIONING DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 3 & 
n.6 (2003) (discussing the various domestic and international terrorist lists along with 
the prohibition of U.S. aid to the countries on the lists). 
 145. Id. at 2. 
 146. See generally id. at 4.  In the 2001 executive order establishing the SDGT list, 
President George W. Bush cited “the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial 
foundation of foreign terrorists” as justification for imposing “financial sanctions . . . 
[on] those foreign persons that support or otherwise associate with . . . foreign 
terrorists.”  Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001). 
 147. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(a) (2012). 
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that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such 
hostilities or attacks against the United States.”148  President George W. 
Bush invoked this authority following 9/11 when he issued Executive 
Order 13,224, giving the United States the power to freeze the assets 
of and prohibit transactions with those designated as SGDTs.149 
The Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the Secretaries of State 
and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, may designate 
individuals or entities as SDTs or SDGTs if they are determined to be 
one of the following:  (1) one who has committed or poses a “significant 
risk” of committing a terrorist act;150 (2) one “owned or controlled by, 
or . . . [who] act[s] for or on behalf of, any person” already listed in 
the SDT or SDGT lists;151 (3) one who “assist[s] in, sponsor[s], or 
provide[s] financial, material, or technological support for, or 
financial or other services to or in support of” either terrorist acts or 
individuals already on the SDT or SDGT lists;152 or (4) one “otherwise 
associated” with any individual already on the SDT or SDGT lists.153 
Similar to the U.N. sanctioning regimes, critics have attacked the 
SDGT listing criteria as extremely broad and constitutionally flawed.  
Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union have argued 
that the list violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments because it lacks 
the required procedural protections guaranteed by the 
Constitution154—and courts have tended to agree.155  Despite these 
criticisms, the Treasury Department has not made any public 
announcements of changes to address these issues.156 
                                               
 148. § 1702(a)(1)(C). 
 149. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001). 
 150. 31 C.F.R. § 594.201(as)(2) (2016). 
 151. § 594.201(a)(3). 
 152. § 594.201(a)(4)(i)(A)–(B). 
 153. § 594.201(a)(4)(ii). 
 154. See, e.g., ACLU, THE “SPECIALLY-DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORIST” DESIGNATION 
SCHEME AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS 4–5, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/sdgt_designation_briefer_
final.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter SPECIALLY-DESIGNATED GLOBAL 
TERRORIST]. 
 155. See Al Haramain Islamic Found. Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 
979 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding OFAC did not sufficiently protect procedural due process 
in its use of classified information without paper disclosure); KindHearts for 
Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (N.D. Ohio 
2009) (addressing OFAC’s denial of procedural due process prior to freezing assets). 
 156. See SPECIALLY-DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORIST 4, supra note 154. 
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2. International laws of war 
In contrast to the U.S. and U.N. lists, IHL is based in laws and doctrines 
that are laden with detailed procedural protections.  However, the 
applicability of international law to transnational terrorist organizations 
and individuals suspected of terrorist acts has not been well 
developed.157  IHL governs the conduct of wartime activities toward 
both combatants and noncombatants,158 and it is defined by the four 
Geneva Conventions,159 the first two Additional Protocols of the 
Geneva Conventions,160 and a body of customary law.161  While the 
United States is a party to the Conventions and is thereby bound to 
“respect and ensure to respect” the treaties,162 the government has not 
incorporated most of these treaties into domestic law.163 
Despite the lack of domestic laws, the moral weight of the 
Conventions and customary international law still weigh heavily over 
U.S. policy and politics.164  Thus, courts often must address the 
                                               
 157. See generally Priester, supra note 51, at 1276–79 (providing an overview of the 
complexities of applying international law to terrorism cases). 
 158. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 1 
(2004), https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/4541/what-is-ihl-factsheet.pdf. 
 159. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
 160. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Protocol I]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Protocol II]. 
 161. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 158, at 1–4 (noting that IHL is 
composed of treaty-based law, customary rules, and general principles of law). 
 162. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 159, art. 1 (“The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances.”). 
 163. The only legally binding treaty within the United States regarding the Geneva 
Conventions remains Common Article 3 of the Conventions, which was incorporated 
into domestic law through 18 U.S.C. § 2441, and criminalizes war crimes, including 
torture and cruel or inhuman treatment.  18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1) (2012). 
 164. While not incorporated in domestic law in the United States, the Geneva 
Conventions’ applicability to the U.S. policy on terrorist detainees was a hot-button 
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applicability of international law to domestic cases when the cases 
involve U.S. actions abroad or actions against non-U.S. citizens during 
conflict.  Because there is no statutory mandate for the courts, a variety 
of factors determine whether they must follow customary international 
law.  As is often the case, the persuasiveness of international law 
principles depends on the particular court and the particular issue.165 
Given Congress’s intent in enacting § 2339B as a counterterrorism 
measure, Israel’s perspective is worth U.S. courts’ attention.  In Israel, 
like in the United States, the military routinely engages in anti-
terrorism operations.166  Both countries have experienced attacks on 
their citizens by politically or religiously motivated organizations, and 
both countries have developed robust anti-terrorism laws to combat 
terrorism and the financing of terrorist activities.167  Additionally, 
Israel’s highest court has heard petitions related to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, giving the court the opportunity to develop 
relatively robust jurisprudence on various aspects of IHL.168 
The Israeli High Court of Justice’s169 decision in Public Committee 
Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel170 provides an analogous 
                                               
issue during the Bush and Obama administrations.  See John B. Bellinger, III, Obama, 
Bush, and the Geneva Conventions, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 11, 2010, 8:31 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/08/11/obama-bush-and-the-geneva-conventions 
(comparing the Obama and the Bush administration’s conclusions on the Geneva 
Conventions’ applicability to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq). 
 165. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(relying on customary international law and international treaties to hold that the 
government had authority to detain enemy combatants), with Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 
F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that international law does not limit the scope 
of the President’s detention power). 
 166. See generally Aviv (Cohen) Dekel, The Unique Challenge of Dual-Purpose 
Organizations:  Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Israel Approaches to Combating the Finance 
of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 392–99 (2013) (comparing U.S. 
and Israeli approaches to combatting terrorism financing). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., Victor Kattan, The Legality of the West Bank Wall:  Israel’s High Court of 
Justice v. The International Court of Justice, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1425, 1425–28 
(2007) (dissecting High Court of Justice cases with a relationship to Palestine and 
noting the court often considers IHL as a guide). 
 169. The High Court of Justice rules as a court of first instance, primarily regarding 
the legality of State authority decisions.  Its jurisdiction is limited to matters it considers 
necessary to grant relief in the interests of justice and that are not within the 
jurisdiction of another court or tribunal.  YAACOV S. ZEMACH, THE JUDICIARY OF ISRAEL 
48 (3d ed. 2002). 
 170. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. [2006](2) IsrLR 
459 (Isr.). 
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framework for determining who is part of an FTO under § 2339B 
because it was a judicial attempt to clarify the legal status of civilians 
who take “direct participation in hostilities” (“DPH”).171  DPH is a 
concept from Article 51(3) of Protocol I that states that civilians should 
not be targeted for killing during conflicts “unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.”172  This is a critical determination 
because of the changing nature of war:  terrorists tend to hide within 
civilian populations, individuals may fluidly join and quit terrorist 
organizations, and militaries increasingly rely on civilian contractors.173 
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, the court delved into the 
definition of DPH to create a more concrete set of criteria to 
determine when an individual is a legally targetable civilian because of 
the individual’s engagement in terrorist activities.  The court broke 
Article 51(3) into three components:  (1) “hostilities”; (2) “taking a 
direct part”; and (3) “for such time.” 
First, the court defined “hostilities” broadly as acts, which by nature 
and objective, are intended to cause damage to the army or to other 
civilians.174  Second, the court also defined “taking direct part” in a 
broad way, explaining that the expansive definition served to deter 
civilians from joining hostilities.175  As a guide, the court then went on 
to provide examples of participation that should be included in the 
definition of “taking a direct part”:  someone who “collects information 
about the armed forces”; “leads unlawful combatants to or from the 
place where the hostilities are being carried out”; “operates weapons 
being used by unlawful combatants”; or “supervises their operation or 
provides service for them, whatever the distance . . . from the 
battlefield may be.”176 
 On the other hand, actions not considered “taking a direct part” 
include an individual who “sells an unlawful combatant food products 
or medicines”; “helps unlawful combatants with a general strategic 
analysis and grants them general logistic support, including financial 
                                               
 171. See generally Eric Christensen, The Dilemma of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 
19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 300 (2010) (examining the interpretations of the 
phrase “direct participation in hostilities”).  In this case, the court addressed the 
legality of Israel’s preventive strike policy against Palestine in the early 2000s.  Id. 
 172. Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 160, art. 51(3). 
 173. See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 171, at 282 (describing the advantages and 
disadvantages to different interpretations of DPH). 
 174. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr., [2006](2) IsrLR at 493. 
 175. Id. at 494–96. 
 176. Id. at 496–97. 
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support”; or “disseminates propaganda that supports those unlawful 
combatants.”177 
Third, the court addressed the definition of “for such time,” which 
is the time commitment required for the court to deem an individual 
a combatant rather than a civilian.178  The court was aware of the 
“revolving door” nature of terrorism, in which individuals may often 
come and go as they please, in contrast to a national military in which 
individuals serve a term of years.  On one hand, the court found it 
overly harsh to allow the government to target for killing a civilian who 
only participated in a hostile act once in the distant past; on the other 
hand, the court stated that civilians who regularly participate in hostile 
actions could be targeted at nearly any time.179  With this framework, 
the court provided a set of criteria that illustrate prohibited or 
permitted activities that a U.S. judge could consider when deciding the 
FTO question in a § 2339B case.180 
IV.  DETERMINING WHO IS PART OF AN FTO UNDER § 2339B SHOULD 
INCORPORATE IHL AND THE SDGT LISTING CRITERIA 
The Jama seven-factor test grants too much discretion to the 
judiciary.  The effect of this judicial test is to label an individual a 
“terrorist” under U.S. law;181 with this outcome, courts should not rely 
on a test that fails to balance the stigma and consequences of the terrorist 
label with the reality of terrorist organizations’ varying structures and 
group affiliation networks.182  Because the plain meaning of “provides 
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”183 is 
                                               
 177. Id. at 497. 
 178. Id. at 499. 
 179. Id. at 500. 
 180. Not all were pleased with the decision, however.  See, e.g., Gideon Levy, An 
Enlightened Occupier, HAARETZ (Dec. 17, 2006, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.haaretz.com/an-enlightened-occupier-1.207387 (“All the restrictions the 
High Court of Justice placed on targeted assassinations are no more than a collection 
of hollow words.”). 
 181. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (describing the legal 
ramifications of FTO designation for its members, including inability to travel to the 
United States, asset seizure, and prosecution under § 2339B). 
 182. See generally Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve:  Globalization and 
International Terrorism, INT’L SEC., Winter 2002/2003, at 30, 38 (describing 
international terrorism as characterized by religious and spiritually motivated 
movements, exacerbated by “states, entities, and people who . . . support them because 
they feel powerless and left behind in a globalizing world”). 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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ambiguous, looking to comparative jurisprudence would have 
provided the Jama court with insight into how other courts and 
institutions have addressed similar legal questions.184  As it stands, the 
test the Jama court created is simply too vague and overreaching.  
Instead, the proper test courts should utilize to determine whether an 
individual is part of an FTO under § 2339B is one that incorporates 
elements from U.S. sanctioning regimes and IHL. 
A.  Criticism of the Jama Test 
Even if the Jama court did not err in ignoring analogous laws to 
answer § 2339B’s FTO question, the court’s use and reading of the 
definition of “personnel”—a word included within the definition of 
the phrase “material support”—was flawed.  Under the statutory 
canons of construction, if Congress intended the definition of 
“personnel” to also apply to who is part of an FTO, Congress would 
have made that explicit within the statute.  This weakness illustrates 
that the proposed test—that an individual is deemed part of an FTO if 
he or she conducts “significant activity” on behalf of the FTO—is too 
vague and lacks consideration of other relevant factors.185 
1.  The Jama court improperly relied on the definition of “personnel” to 
interpret § 2339B 
In an attempt to clarify what it means to provide material support to 
a terrorist organization, the Jama court relied on the definition of 
“personnel.”186  The statute includes the word “personnel” within the 
definition of “material support,” indicating that recruitment efforts on 
behalf of an FTO are considered “material support” and are 
prohibited.187  The definition of “personnel” in full states: 
                                               
 184. See supra notes 133–42 and accompanying text. 
 185. This Comment avoids duplicating the Jama defendants’ arguments on appeal 
and instead provides alternative critiques of the Jama test and reasoning.  In their 
appeal, counsel for the defendants have put forth many challenges, including that the 
court created an improperly broad definition of the word “organization”; that other 
courts have construed “FTO” members to include only those under a formal command 
and control structure; and that the district court’s “statutory construction violated 
basic principles of federal criminal law,” such as the rule of lenity.  Joint Opening Brief 
of the Appellants at 20–24, 28, United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882 (E.D. Va. 
2016) (No. 1:14-cr-230-AJT), appeal docketed, Nos. 17-4205(l), 17-4226 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 
2017). 
 186. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 886. 
 187. Id. 
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No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with 
the term “personnel” unless that person has knowingly provided, 
attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist 
organization with [one] or more individuals (who may be or include 
himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control 
or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that 
organization.  Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign 
terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be 
considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s 
direction and control.188 
The court treated the definition as an indicator of congressional intent 
to only exclude those working “entirely independently” of the FTO 
from § 2339B’s reach and to include “all persons who act on behalf of 
an FTO to further its goals and objectives in significant ways.”189 
It is worth reemphasizing that the Jama court could not have relied 
upon the statute’s congressional history because the record is silent on 
the requisite level of connection to an FTO to satisfy § 2339B.  Nor was 
there precedent from the higher courts.  With this the case, the rule of 
criminal statutory construction is that ambiguous statutes imposing a 
penalty are generally subject to strict construction and interpreted in 
favor of defendants,190 but a court’s interpretation cannot provide a 
substitute for common sense.191  In addition, “[j]ust as Congress’[s] 
choice of words [in a statute] is presumed to be deliberate, so too are 
its structural choices.”192 
In this instance, there are no circumstances to dissuade from strict 
construction.  Congress intended § 2339B to cut off all financing to 
terrorist groups, particularly those FTOs that serve dual roles within 
the community—both carrying out unlawful “terrorist” acts and 
providing lawful political or social services.193  Congress was concerned 
with the fungibility of money given to that type of organization; thus, 
                                               
 188. § 2339B(h) (emphasis added). 
 189. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 892 (emphasis added). 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 519 (2008) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that courts must “interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants, 
not prosecutors”); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Line, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973) 
(construing exemptions from antitrust laws strictly); Beulah v. State, 42 S.W.3d 461, 
466 (Ark. 2001) (“This court strictly construes criminal statutes . . . .”). 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 227–30 (1966) 
(analyzing the legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors Act to interpret the 
meaning of the word “refuse”). 
 192. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2529 (2013). 
 193. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent 
in passing § 2339B). 
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Congress removed the intent requirement and instead criminalized 
providing “material support,” no matter the intended use.194  However, 
the history of § 2339B does not touch upon the threshold to be 
considered part of a terrorist organization—it concerns the actions of 
the hypothetical defendant, not the nuances of FTO membership.195  
With such a gap in precedent and legislative history, the court in Jama 
erred in construing § 2339B’s language so broadly. 
Yet the record is not silent as to the “personnel” definition within 
§ 2339B on which the Jama court based its reasoning.  The “personnel” 
definition was not included within the statute until the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004196—eight years after 
Congress enacted § 2339B.197  In the congressional history, various 
officials refer to the newly included “personnel” definition multiple 
times as a mere clarification of terms to avoid various legal challenges 
claiming that the word was unconstitutionally vague.198  No official ever 
suggested that “personnel” should be read into who is part of an FTO 
under the statute. 
Based on this history, the court erred in using the definition of 
“personnel” because it is inconsistent with the congressional intent and 
structure of § 2339B as a whole.  First, there is clear history that 
Congress did not intend for “personnel” to refer back to the definition 
of an FTO within § 2339B.  Second, even if the court did not err in 
relying on the definition, the canons of construction maxim expressio 
                                               
 194. See § 2339B (criminalizing the act of knowingly providing material support to 
an FTO, regardless of what type of material support is provided or how it is used by 
the FTO). 
 195. See supra Section I.A–B (examining the history of § 2339B and the statute’s 
current form). 
 196. Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. § 401 
(2012)). 
 197. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 18 (“Section 2339B alone has a more explicit 
description of “personnel” covered by its proscription, which confines the term to 
those provided to [an FTO] to direct its activities or to work under its direction or 
control.”). 
 198. See A Review of the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) 
(statement of Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General) (“The [bill] amends the 
definition of ‘personnel[]’ . . . in a way that addresses the concerns about vagueness 
and at the same time maintains the statutes' effectiveness.”); H.R. REP. NO. 108-724, at 
224 (2004) (amending § 2339B with the definition of “personnel”); 151 Cong. Rec. 
6566 (Apr. 14, 2005); see also United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F. Supp. 2d 362, 397–98 
(D. Conn. 2009) (“These changes to § 2339B were enacted against a backdrop of 
numerous legal challenges to that provision on the ground of vagueness.”). 
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unius est exclusio alterius states that “where an offense is defined by 
statute and its application to enumerated conditions prescribed, it is 
implied that it will not apply to other conditions not enumerated.”199  
Put more simply, the express mention of one thing excludes all 
others.200  Accordingly, the breadth of the court’s test that includes 
those working on “behalf of an FTO” in “significant ways” is flawed.  A 
proper reading of “personnel” would be narrowed to include only 
those activities enumerated in the definition:  activities conducted 
under the “direction or control” of the FTO or related to 
“organiz[ing], manag[ing], supervis[ing], or otherwise direct[ing] the 
operation of that organization.”201 
There are other problems with the court’s interpretation of the 
“personnel” definition.  Consider that the definition of “personnel” is 
only included in § 2339B and appears in no other anti-terrorism 
statute—not even § 2339A, which is most closely related to § 2339B.202  
This omission is striking given that both statutes prohibit providing 
“material support.”  As a result, a handful of courts have determined 
that § 2339B is subject to the definitional limitation, while § 2339A is 
subject to a much broader definition of “personnel,” akin to one found 
in the average dictionary.203  These courts have found that the 
definition of personnel purposefully constrains liability under § 2339B 
by limiting the scope of the term to specific individuals working under 
a specific structure or conducting specific activities listed in the 
definition.  It is ironic then that the court in Jama would later use this 
term to proclaim that an FTO includes “all persons who act on behalf 
of an FTO to further its goals and objectives in significant ways”—a 
broad and far-reaching statement. 
Though the court construed the term to include “all persons,” in 
fact, there is a wide range of possible participation that is not included 
in the “personnel” definition.  For example, a financier is one such 
person whose function would not be included between acting “entirely 
independently” and “under [a] terrorist organization’s direction or 
control or . . . organiz[ing], manag[ing], supervis[ing], or otherwise 
                                               
 199. 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 189 (2012). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 18 (“Section 2339B alone has a more explicit 
description of ‘personnel’ covered by its proscription, which confines the term to those 
provided to [an FTO] to direct its activities or to work under its direction or control.”). 
 203. Id.; see also Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Authority, 651 F.3d 118, 126 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); Abu-Jihaad, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
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direct[ing] the operation of [an] organization.”204  A financier is not 
under the direction or control of an FTO or in a position to direct an 
FTO’s operation; in many cases, this individual is a middleman between 
an “entirely independent” supporter and the FTO.  The exclusion of a 
financier from the “personnel” definition is a strict reading of the 
statute, and it fails to comport with § 2339B’s purpose to eradicate 
terrorist funding.  This failure further illustrates the court’s error in 
relying on the definition to create its “significant activity” test. 
2.  The court’s “significant activity” test is too broad and does not consider the 
realities of terrorist activity 
The Jama court’s totality of the circumstances test, stating that 
individuals are part of an FTO when they are “engaged in significant 
activity on behalf of an FTO relative to that FTO’s goals and 
objectives,”205 is overly vague.  “Significant activity” is a broad term, and 
its lack of specificity is especially troubling given § 2339B’s lengthy 
sentences and the stigma society attaches to the “terrorist” label.  The 
Jama court, possibly recognizing that “significant activity” does not 
clarify an already ambiguous concept, set out seven non-exclusive 
factors to guide courts in future analyses.206  These factors include “the 
nature of the assistance” and the benefit received by the FTO; the 
“time period” of the support; whether the support was “specifically and 
exclusively for the benefit of the FTO”; the amount the support was 
“directed by or coordinated with” the FTO; any interactions with 
others associated with the FTO (including FTO leadership); whether 
the “individual self-identifies with the FTO”; and whether the 
individual is “identified as being part of an FTO by recognized 
international law enforcement or other organizations.” 
Some of these factors have little resemblance to legal doctrines 
determining sufficient association with an entity and are not 
particularly descriptive or helpful in understanding the nuances of 
terrorist engagement with an FTO.  For example, considering 
“whether the individual undertakes his or her activities specifically and 
exclusively for the benefit of the FTO or whether the individual 
undertakes similar activities for other organizations or for the public 
at large”207 is an odd take on addressing the question; it relies on 
                                               
 204. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2012). 
 205. United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882, 892 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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surface-level exclusivity of membership with a particular organization 
and not the degree, quality, or type of participation. 
Other factors unfairly assume the answer to the question.  
Consideration of “whether the individual is reliably identified as being 
part of an FTO by recognized international law enforcement or other 
organizations”208 or “whether the individual self-identifies with the 
FTO, represents himself or herself as being part of the FTO, or 
purports to act on behalf of the FTO”209 are obvious indications of 
involvement, but there are serious issues with both factors.  For the 
former factor, across the spectrum, international law enforcement 
bodies have varying levels of evidentiary standards, and Jama gives no 
indication as to what standards it would deem acceptable or 
unacceptable.  Many enforcement arms in international law are 
imperfect, unevenly applied, and slow to work.210  There is no 
guarantee that evidentiary standards of “international law 
enforcement or other organizations” are in line with the high 
standards of the U.S. judiciary system and the U.S. Constitution. 
The latter factor requires no evidence that the individual has actually 
committed any act on behalf of the organization at all, potentially 
implicating First Amendment freedoms of association and speech.  
This “self-identification” factor may lead to confusion when 
distinguishing between FTO members and “lone wolf” terrorists, who 
may be inspired by an FTO but who are not considered part of it.211  
For example, this nuance allowed President Barack Obama to claim in 
December 2016 that “[n]o foreign terrorist organization ha[d] 
successfully planned and executed an attack on our homeland” during 
his administration.212  This created some controversy because of the 
                                               
 208. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 892. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, ASIL (Jan. 22, 1996), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law 
(examining the enforcement mechanisms used by the United Nations). 
 211. See generally Katie Worth, Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common—and More 
Deadly, FRONTLINE PBS (July 14, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/ 
lone-wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-and-more-deadly (“[The] definition of 
a lone wolf is narrow:  To be included, the perpetrator must be politically motivated . . . 
and they must act entirely on their own.”). 
 212. Remarks on United States Counterterrorism Strategy at MacDill Air Force Base, 
Florida, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3–4 (Dec. 6, 2016) (“[T]he most deadly attacks on 
the homeland over the last [eight] years have not been carried out by operatives with 
sophisticated networks or equipment, directed from abroad.  They’ve been carried out 
by homegrown and largely isolated individuals who were radicalized online.”). 
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terror attacks that occurred in the United States during his tenure, 
including the San Bernardino, California, attack in which a radicalized 
married couple killed 14 people and wounded 22; the shooting at Fort 
Hood, Texas, in which a U.S. Army major killed 13 people and 
wounded 32 others; and the Boston Marathon bombings, in which two 
brothers made a homemade bomb that killed 2 people and wounded 
132.213  According to the Department of Homeland Security’s “Global 
Terrorism Database,” these attackers were “unaffiliated individuals” 
who were not part of an FTO, despite all being inspired by and self-
identifying with terrorist groups.214 
The shortcomings of these factors are apparent upon reflection.  
With such weaknesses built into the test, the Jama court should have 
more conscientiously considered and learned from the proposed tests 
before creating its own. 
B.  The Defendants’ and Government’s Proposed Tests in Jama Are Not 
Perfect, but They Provide Useful Insight 
The Jama court missed an opportunity to look to analogous laws—
both international and domestic—for help in determining what 
factors should be relevant to define the adequacy of ties to an FTO.215  
These comparative laws can provide alternative frameworks for 
answering the difficult question of who is part of an FTO.  The 
defendants’ and government’s proposed tests included examples of 
both types of law.  The defendants relied on analogous U.N. 
sanctioning regimes216 to argue that the correct test would require that 
the individual receiving the material support operates under the 
“command and control” structure of a recognized FTO leadership and 
is a “member” of the FTO, as opposed to a “supporter” or 
“financier.”217  The government, on the other hand, proposed a test 
                                               
 213. See Glenn Kessler, Obama’s Claim that No Foreign Terror Organization “Successfully” 
Attacked the Homeland on His Watch, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/12/08/obamas-
claims-that-no-foreign-terror-organization-successfully-attacked-the-homeland-on-his-
watch (noting multiple “high-profile terror attacks”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See supra Section III.B (addressing additional tests derived from international 
or domestic law that the Jama court could have used). 
 216. See infra Section III.A.1 (describing the U.N. sanctioning regime structure of 
resolutions aimed at preventing terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State from receiving financial support). 
 217. United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882, 891 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
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similar to the test courts use to determine whether an individual is part 
of an “enterprise” under RICO.218  The court did not expound much 
on the reasons why it rejected both arguments, but the analogous 
frameworks are worth further analysis; each resolve questions that 
closely resemble the Jama issue. 
1.  U.S. federal law, the government’s argument, and the applicability to 
§ 2339B 
Though the question of membership within a criminal enterprise is 
similar to the § 2339B question, the court correctly dismissed the 
government’s proposed RICO-based test.219  The government would be 
heavily favored in a test that relied on the factors used in RICO because 
courts read RICO very broadly to encompass a wide variety of 
“enterprises” and “racketeering activities.”220  For instance, the 
requisite activity must occur only two times within a ten-year span;221 
no continuous activity or normalized schedule need exist.222 
The RICO elements certainly err on the side of inclusion within an 
enterprise and this flexible standard encompasses a wide range of 
organizational structures.223  While some structure is needed that includes 
“a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, 
and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the 
enterprise’s purpose,”224 the defendant in question only needs to be a 
central figure in the particular scheme, not necessarily a central figure 
in the organization as a whole.225  Therefore, inclusion within an 
“enterprise” for the purpose of RICO can be proved through evidence 
that the individuals had a common goal or jointly committed a crime.226 
At the time RICO was passed, the U.S. government needed a flexible 
standard to effectively tackle organized crime because prosecutors 
                                               
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (stating simply that “[t]he government proposes a much less formal test, akin to 
that used to determine whether someone is part of a criminal enterprise under [RICO]”). 
 220. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (“RICO is to be 
read broadly.”). 
 221. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text (describing the elements for a 
RICO prosecution). 
 222. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text (describing enterprises under 
RICO to be loosely associated). 
 224. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See supra Section III.A.2 (discussing the parameters of inclusion within an 
“enterprise” under RICO). 
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could generally only reach the low-level criminals and not the upper-
level kingpins of the criminal organizations.227  Yet there are a plethora 
of federal statutes available to the government to prosecute terrorists 
of all levels and types of engagement with terrorists, terrorist groups, 
or countries alleged to be supporting terrorism.228  Section 2339B is 
not the only way the government could prosecute a terrorism case, and 
the government need not even use an anti-terrorism statute 
specifically.  For example, the government could instead prosecute 
under a law like § 2339A, which criminalizes providing material 
support to any “terrorist,” or like conspiracy.229  The intent behind the 
creation of RICO and that of § 2339B is distinct, and the laws arose in 
different contexts.  With the variety of antiterrorism statutes available 
to prosecutors, inclusion within an FTO should not be as fluid as 
inclusion within an “enterprise.” 
2.  U.N. sanctions, the defendants’ argument, and the applicability to 
§ 2339B 
The Jama court correctly dismissed the defendants’ proposed test 
based on the U.N. sanctioning criteria,230 but the court ignored lessons 
it could have gleaned from the United Nation’s “terrorist lists.”231  The 
defendants claimed that an FTO has an “identifiable structure with 
identifiable leaders and persons who are under the command and 
control of that leadership,” so FTOs should be considered different 
                                               
 227. See generally Brian P. Comerford, Note, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting 
Material Support, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723, 732–33 (2005) (analogizing the federal 
RICO laws to the material support statutes). 
 228. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2012) (use of weapons of mass destruction); 
§ 2332d (financial transactions in support of international terrorism); § 2332f 
(bombings of places of public use, government facilities, public transportation systems, 
and infrastructure facilities); cf. Susan Hennessey, Is DOJ Rethinking Material Support 
Laws and Domestic Terrorism?, LAWFARE (Feb. 5, 2016, 1:06 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/doj-rethinking-material-support-laws-and-domestic-
terrorism (“[T]here is a demonstrable disparate impact to Muslim populations in the 
realm of material support laws.  Put simply, supporting a foreign terrorist 
organization—designations which are overwhelmingly applied to groups of Islamic 
identity—is a serious federal offense.  While supporting a domestic terrorist 
organization—say, an armed militia occupying a federal building—is not.”). 
 229. Contra Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. 
& POL’Y 297, 301 (2008) (arguing that § 2339B reaches crimes not covered by other 
criminal laws and is the nearest thing the United States has to criminalizing being a terrorist). 
 230. United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882, 892 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 231. See supra notes 145–68 and accompanying text (discussing various 
international terrorist lists). 
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from domestic criminal organizations with more fluid structures.232  
The defendants argued for a test that requires the individual receiving 
the material support to be under the “command and control” of an 
FTO or to be a “member” of an FTO, not merely a “supporter,” 
“financier,” or “facilitator.”233 In support of their position, the 
defendants cited to the U.N. terrorist designations, which distinguish 
between a “member” of an FTO and other types of participants.234 
While the defendants’ proposed test claimed that FTOs have an 
identifiable structure,235 FTO structures, in fact, vary widely.236  
Scholars in the counterterrorism field have distinguished between 
prior waves of terrorism and terrorist organizations, which were often 
structured in a straight-forward hierarchical fashion, with the current 
wave of terrorist organizations, which often have a networked structure 
and operate independent of a central command.237  For example, al-
Qaeda is a network structure with many branches, and its core 
leadership only serves to centralize messaging and strategy rather than 
manage the daily operations of its organization.238  Al-Qaeda’s affiliates 
operate relatively unchecked by any senior management.239  In 
contrast, ISIL leadership claims to directly control its members, and 
the governing structure is hierarchical with a vertical leadership 
format.240  Based on the differing structures of terrorist organizations 
and how they are evolving over time, the Jama court rightly dismissed 
the defendants’ argument that individuals must operate within the 
“command and control” of recognized FTO leadership because not 
every FTO has a recognizable leadership structure. 
The defendants’ argument that the individual must be a “member” 
of an FTO, as opposed to a “supporter,” “financier,” or “facilitator,” 
                                               
 232. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 891. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Peterson, supra note 229, at 298 (“Today, fewer terrorists are still affiliated 
with structured organizations; instead, the greatest threat to the United States comes 
from a diffuse global network of terrorists.”). 
 237. See generally William F. Shughart II, An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945–2000, 
128 PUB. CHOICE, No. 1/2, July 2006, at 12–32. 
 238. See Cameron Glenn, Al Qaeda v ISIS:  Leaders & Structure, WILSON CTR. (Sept. 
28, 2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure 
(distinguishing between the organizational structures of al-Qaeda and ISIL, which has 
a direct hierarchical structure). 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. 
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based on U.N. designations,241 also departs from the congressional 
intent to stop financing of terrorist organizations through § 2339B.  
“Supporters” may well be excluded from FTOs, as they may include the 
FTO-inspired lone wolf terrorists and individuals who never participate 
in terrorist acts in any way.242  However, it does not make sense to 
exclude “financiers” from being part of an FTO when Congress 
consciously enacted § 2339B in response to fears that FTOs were 
raising funds within the United States.243  While independent 
supporters may never act on behalf of an FTO, many financiers are 
presumably actively involved in fundraising or transferring funds on 
behalf of the FTO. 
The Jama court was likely correct when it stated that the “United 
Nations’ system of categorization of persons associated with an FTO is 
not inconsistent with Congress’s overall intention.”244  However, the 
court failed to learn important lessons from the U.N. sanctioning 
systems that could have informed its own efforts to create a test.  When 
the U.N. Security Council first introduced Resolution 1267, it faced 
criticism regarding the accuracy of its definitional system used to 
identify what constituted sufficient association with terrorist groups.245  
In response to the criticism, language within U.N. resolutions evolved 
from sanctioning those who associate with al-Qaeda, “even if they do 
not engage in any financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or 
perpetrating” of terrorism,246 to language that explicitly listed specific 
actions and activities that would lead to U.N. sanctions.247  There are 
now three listing criteria under Resolution 2253, which modified 1267:  
(1) “[p]articipating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, 
or perpetrating of acts”; (2) “[s]upplying, selling or transferring arms 
and related materiel”; or (3) recruiting.248 
                                               
 241. United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 882, 891 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 242. See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text (distinguishing between FTO 
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The Jama court failed to learn from this flaw in the U.N. sanctioning 
regime.  Instead of heeding this example, the Jama court created its 
seven-factor “significant activity” test that focused on overall 
association with an FTO and included no specific activities that would 
guide courts in their determination.249  The list of specific activities 
need not have been exhaustive, but the Jama court should have 
substantially narrowed its criteria and eliminated overly encompassing 
factors like “whether the individual self-identifies with the FTO.”250 
C.  The Proper Test Should Consider the SDGT Criteria and the Public 
Committee Against Torture Analysis and Explicitly Include Prohibited 
Activities and a Temporal Requirement 
The SDGT criteria and Public Committee Against Torture analysis 
should be combined so that courts do not implement a broadly 
construed test.  The Jama court’s “significant activity” test, which 
focuses mainly on factors vaguely describing indicators of 
membership,251 and the previous U.N. sanctioning regimes, which 
critics scrutinized for being overly expansive,252 should serve as 
warnings to future courts deciding how to approach the issue.  The 
SDGT and Public Committee Against Torture designations should be 
combined to accommodate both the congressional intent behind 
§ 2339B to eradicate financing to FTOs under the guise of aid253 and 
§ 2339B’s position as a criminal statute.254 
First, the individual’s personal conduct should fit into one of two 
prongs heavily based on two of the SDGT’s criteria:  (1) “owned or 
controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of,”255 an FTO; or (2) 
“assist[ing] in, sponsor[ing], or provid[ing] financial, material, or 
technological support for, or financial or other services to or in 
support of”256 an FTO’s goals.  Second, based on the Public Committee 
Against Torture analysis, the individual’s conduct should be considered 
                                               
 249. See supra Section IV.A.2 (criticizing the Jama court’s seven-factor test as over 
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as “directly participating” in furtherance of the FTO’s goals at the time 
she receives the material support by either (1) regularly participating 
in the activities set forward above or (2) showing a pattern of acting on 
behalf of an FTO such that a court cannot construe her participation 
as having happened in the distant past. 
The SDGT list is a U.S. government-maintained designation that 
includes specific criteria—short of actually committing a terrorist act—
that suspected “terrorists” must meet before the government freezes 
their assets.  These criteria are:  (1) an individual who has committed 
or poses a “significant risk” of committing a terrorist act;257 (2) an 
individual “owned or controlled by, or [who] act[s] for or on behalf 
of,” an individual or entity already listed in the SDT or SDGT lists;258 
(3) an individual who “assist[s] in, sponsor[s], or provide[s] financial, 
material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to 
or in support of” either terrorist acts or individuals already on the SDT 
or SDGT list;259 or (4) an individual “otherwise associated” with any 
individual already on the SDT or SDGT list.260 
The full SDGT list includes criteria that are overly broad for a test 
determining whether an individual is part of an FTO.  First, the SDGT 
list is created by the Treasury Secretary in consultation with the 
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Attorney 
General.261  To have leeway in determining who is or is not an SDGT, 
it is in the government’s interest to create broadly written criteria so it 
has space to argue the merits of each case.  Especially because the 
government often relies on classified materials not available to the 
public, this flexibility is key to its ability to defend designations to the 
public.  Second, although having one’s assets frozen is a serious penalty 
for designation as an SDGT, it is nowhere near as serious as § 2339B’s 
threat of potential imprisonment.262  A crime with a more serious 
penalty than sanctions should have stricter criteria.  Thus, the 
recommended test for § 2339B includes the criteria designating 
specific prohibited actions and excludes the broad language 
concerning whether an individual is “associated” with an FTO or is a 
“significant risk.” 
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IHL, in contrast, generally provides a high level of procedural 
protections; an understanding of the seriousness of the consequences 
of each legal doctrine; and consideration of the rights applicable to 
civilians, combatants, and criminal defendants.263  For example, in the 
Public Committee Against Torture case, the Israeli court interpreted the 
DPH test to determine the legality of Israel’s “preventive strike policy” 
against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which killed many civilians.264  
The court defined “hostilities” as acts that by nature and objective are 
intended to cause damage to the army or to other civilians,265 and it 
defined “direct part” expansively to encourage civilians to refrain from 
joining hostilities.266  Finally, the court defined the requisite time 
commitment as only “for such time” that the individual takes direct 
part in hostilities.267 
Although the Israeli court undoubtedly made its decision in the 
midst of a highly politicized and sensitive atmosphere, it made a 
calculation of rights available to civilians and terrorists when dissecting 
what it means to directly participate in hostilities.268  The court 
analyzed each word in the phrase “direct part in hostilities” to draw a 
line as specific as possible between “civilian” and “terrorist.”  It made 
its decision based on reasoning intended to remove incentives to join 
a terrorist organization.269  It also provided concrete examples that 
courts and humanitarian organizations alike could look to when 
determining whether material support is going to an FTO.270 
However, in contrast to the SDGT list, the Public Committee Against 
Torture analysis is too narrow in its interpretation.  The Israeli court 
stated that individuals who gather tactical intelligence, transport 
terrorists to the site of an attack, operate weapons or supervise the 
operation of weapons, or service weapons are all taking a direct part in 
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hostilities.271  On the other hand, individuals are not considered to 
directly participate in hostilities if they sell food or medicine to 
terrorists, provide strategic intelligence, provide logistical support, 
donate money, distribute propaganda, or are employed in the 
armaments industry.272  The court needed to limit the possibility of 
civilian death, which required this strict test with more detailed 
guidelines governing military responsibilities. 
The SGDT list and the Public Committee Against Torture analysis 
balance each other’s weaker points, and a combination of the two tests 
provides a reasonable middle ground for § 2339B.  First, the 
individual’s personal conduct should fit into one of two prongs 
borrowed from the SDGT list:  (1) an individual “owned or controlled 
by, or [who] act[s] for or on behalf of,” an FTO;273 or (2) an individual 
who “assist[s] in, sponsor[s], or provide[s] financial, material, or 
technological support for, or financial or other services to or in 
support of” an FTO’s goals.274 
The two SDGT factors balance the organization of traditional 
models of FTOs that have a hierarchical structure through the first 
prong (“owned or controlled by”) with the organization of modern 
FTOs that have a network structure through the second prong (the list 
of proscribed activities).  To ensure that the § 2339B test does not 
improperly pull in lone wolves who are merely inspired by an FTO, the 
first and fourth prongs of the SDGT list—an individual who has 
committed or poses a “significant risk” of committing a terrorist act275 
and individuals who are “otherwise associated” with any individual 
already on the SDT or SDGT list276—are excluded. 
Second, borrowing from the Public Committee Against Torture analysis, 
the individual’s conduct should be considered as “directly 
participating” in furtherance of the FTO’s goals at the time he or she 
receives the material support.  This means that the individual must 
either be “owned or controlled by, or . . . act[ing] for or on behalf 
of”277 an FTO or be intentionally “assist[ing] in, sponsor[ing], or 
provid[ing] financial, material, or technological support for, or 
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financial or other services to or in support of”278 the FTO at the time 
the individual receives the material support.  If the individual does not 
regularly participate in the listed activities or has not shown a pattern 
of acting on behalf of an FTO, then that does not constitute “directly 
participating.”  The inclusion of the “directly participating” 
requirement serves the important purpose of excluding those who may 
have disengaged from the FTO, those who may live in close proximity 
with FTO members but do not act on the FTO’s behalf, and those who 
live in areas where the FTO is the de facto government and thus rely 
on some contact with the FTO to function in society.  An individual 
who regularly engages in the proscribed activities on behalf of an FTO 
should obviously be deemed part of an FTO, but, for example, an 
individual who had engaged in activities on behalf of an FTO once 
several years prior should not be caught in § 2339B’s web or foreclosed 
from ever receiving aid from an aid agency. 
Taking these two factors into account will be a highly fact-specific 
inquiry, but it will provide greater clarity among humanitarian groups 
interacting with those who may be linked to terrorist organizations and 
among courts deciding § 2339B cases.  This integrated model balances 
the importance of personal conduct and group affiliation by focusing 
on defined actions within a particular time period on behalf of an 
FTO—not just mere contact.  These defined actions will then provide 
a useful guide for others, like aid organizations, trying to avoid 
prosecution under § 2339B. 
CONCLUSION 
 Section 2339B imposes criminal liability on individuals who 
“knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization, or attempt[] or conspire[] to do so.”  Since its 
enactment, the U.S. government has successfully wielded the statute as 
a sword against any individual it believes is supporting an FTO—even 
if the individual does not intend to facilitate any terrorist activities.  
This poses a problem for humanitarian aid groups that seek to provide 
assistance to the most vulnerable, who many times may either live 
among terrorist organizations or in areas in fact run by terrorist 
organizations.  In addition, despite the abundance of § 2339B criminal 
cases, no appellate-level court has ever specifically addressed the 
elements necessary for a court to deem the individual receiving the 
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support to be part of an FTO.  Thus, aid groups have little to no 
guidance when they are operating in the field, leaving it either exposed 
to potential prosecution under § 2339B or hesitating to provide 
assistance at all. 
 With this lack of precedent, the Jama court directly addressed the 
issue of who is sufficiently tied to an FTO under § 2339B,279 but its test 
is flawed because the court misinterpreted the “personnel” definition 
and did not take into account similar laws that had decided issues 
analogous to who should be deemed part of an FTO.  The seven-factor 
non-exclusive test that the Jama court created grants too much 
discretion to the judiciary in determining who is sufficiently associated 
with an FTO to be deemed part of it.  The proposed tests from the 
defendants and the government were also untenable. 
The Jama test should be amended to incorporate principles from 
IHL and the U.S. government’s terrorist sanctioning regimes.  Based 
on SDGT criteria, the individual’s personal conduct should fit into two 
of the SDGT’s prongs:  “owned or controlled by, or . . . act[ing] for or 
on behalf of,” an FTO;280 or “assist[ing] in, sponsor[ing], or 
provid[ing] financial, material, or technological support for, or 
financial or other services to or in support of” an FTO’s goals.281  
Further, based on the Public Committee Against Torture analysis, the 
individual’s conduct should be considered as “directly participating” 
in furtherance of the FTO’s goals at the time she receives the material 
support.  A test based on these two factors clarifies who should be part 
of an FTO under § 2339B by balancing the importance of personal 
conduct and actions on behalf of an FTO with an understanding of the 
variety of organizational structures found within FTOs. 
The lack of a clear judicial definition regarding who is part of an 
FTO under § 2339B is particularly troubling for humanitarian aid 
groups fearful of prosecution.  It is crucial for both donors and 
charitable organizations to know who exactly is tied to a designated 
FTO and who is not, especially considering the threat of hefty 
sentencing282 and the far-reaching adverse effects on humanitarian aid 
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delivery.283  The test recommended within this Comment provides an 
opportunity to begin to remedy these concerns, thus ensuring 
smoother humanitarian aid operations and the maximum reach of 
humanitarian aid resources. 
                                               
 283. See supra Part II (discussing § 2339B’s implications on humanitarian aid delivery). 
